Neil Fligstein’s Concept of Organizational Fields, Economic Processes and Dynamics, and Their Significance for Building Russian Markets

  • Svetlana Rumyantseva
  • Ainur Musaeva


This chapter brings together a field framework and economic theories linked to growth and innovation, including evolutionary economics. While a field framework can accommodate change, scholars usually invoke it to examine reproduction. The authors draw on Fligstein’s insights that exogenous shocks—whether economic downturns or sudden state intervention—can force field leaders and members to seek new field rules and conceptions of control. These might not always favor innovation, however, as rent-seeking or simply maintaining stability can outweigh perceived opportunities and gains from innovation. Further, field rules in contemporary Russia are not so kind to innovation, as too many (but not all) field leaders in the state and business prefer stability, often enough for rent-seeking. To the extent there might be some hope, however, it is with professionalization, especially in arbitration courts.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Svetlana Rumyantseva
    • 1
  • Ainur Musaeva
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Economics, Department of Economic TheorySt. Petersburg State UniversitySt. PetersburgRussia

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