Privacy and Responsibility

  • Mane Hajdin
Part of the AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice book series (AMIN, volume 8)


This article offers an account of the basis of the right to privacy that gives it stronger unity than the accounts currently available. It does so by showing that privacy is necessary for responsibility: one cannot assume responsibility for something without first articulating what it is that one is assuming responsibility for, and the right to privacy protects the “drafting space” in which to articulate it. This implies that we all have a direct stake in each other’s privacy, unlike other accounts of privacy, which focus on why one’s privacy is desirable to oneself. The article then proceeds to show how thinking about the right to privacy in this way can explain some of its features that otherwise appear puzzling and how it provides a theoretical tool for dealing with problems that involve privacy.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mane Hajdin
    • 1
  1. 1.Notre Dame de Namur UniversityBelmontUSA

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