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Banking Regulation and Supervision in Europe

  • Antonella Cappiello
Chapter

Abstract

Considering lessons learnt from financial crises, in November 2014 the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) entered into operation. Though its statement did not explicitly refer to the banking union or to any other “pillars” of it, there was an implicit reference to the fact that supervision was a precondition for bringing to the European level other elements of the banking framework, notably in the area of crisis resolution.

This chapter underlines that although the framework is overall comprehensive and well advanced, however it remains incomplete, and several challenges remain to overcome. First, we need to notice that if a single resolution authority, established in 2015, assumed full responsibilities in 2016, a single deposit insurance, though having been recognised as an integral part of that construction, does not exist yet, nor there is an agreed time frame for it. This further step is instead necessary to complete and harmonise the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in the euro area.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Antonella Cappiello
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and ManagementUniversity of PisaPisaItaly

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