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‘Success’ and ‘Failure’ in International Development: Assessing Evolving UK Objectives in Conditional Aid Policy Since the Cold War

  • Jonathan Fisher
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter explores the difficulties presented to scholars and policymakers in assessing the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of policy initiatives in the face of changing objectives of such initiatives. To what extent can success or failure be clearly delineated when the implementers of a policy seek to evaluate it according to a new, perhaps unstated, logic or to placate multiple audiences? The study examines these questions in relation to the UK Government’s international development policies, focusing particularly upon the imposition of aid cuts premised on political concerns (political conditionality; PC). The chapter underlines how shifts in domestic and international political calculations have fundamentally re-oriented the rationale behind PC for many UK policymakers and unpacks the implications of this for the study of policy successes and failures.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Fisher
    • 1
  1. 1.International Development DepartmentUniversity of BirminghamBirminghamUK

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