Group Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Marriage with Indifferences via the Generalized Assignment Game

  • Nevzat Onur DomaniçEmail author
  • Chi-Kit LamEmail author
  • C. Gregory PlaxtonEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10504)


We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that is group strategyproof for one side of the market. Our key technique involves modeling the stable marriage market as a generalized assignment game. We also show that our mechanism can be implemented efficiently. These results can be extended to the college admissions problem with indifferences.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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