Triangular Diplomacy and Europe’s Changing Gas Network: From “Trying-Angles” to Stable Marriage

  • Adam N. Stulberg


This chapter explicates the puzzle of strategic restraint in gas relations during the 2013–2015 Ukrainian crisis. It spells out the logic of structural energy balancing and traces the transformation of cross-border gas ties from three interacting, but asymmetric “point-to-point” relationships to a triangle system embedded within a broader regional gas network in the lead up to the 2013–2015 conflict. The chapter then probes the strategic consequences of this emerging Euro–Eurasian gas network for facilitating more resilient and diversified relationships in and across Europe, while preserving Russia’s lasting prominence as a commercial supplier. The conclusion explores implications for coercive diplomacy, as well as for strengthening US–Euro–Russian energy governance in the transition to a global gas network.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adam N. Stulberg
    • 1
  1. 1.Sam Nunn School of International AffairsGeorgia Institute of TechnologyAtlantaUSA

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