Empirical Scene Setting: The Contours of the Crisis and Response

  • Alasdair R. Young
  • Vicki L. Birchfield


This chapter sets the stage empirically for the other contributions. It begins by establishing the significance of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine for the transatlantic community before describing the chain of events that led to it. The chapter focuses on how the US and the EU have responded to Russia’s aggression, particularly on efforts aimed at halting the conflict in Ukraine, measures intended to support Ukraine and steps to reassure North Atlantic Treaty Organization members bordering Ukraine. It concludes by identifying three analytically pertinent questions that motivate the rest of the volume: Why are the EU’s policies so similar to those of the US? How has EU-US cooperation affected the policies that they have each pursued? How has that cooperation affected the response to the crisis?


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alasdair R. Young
    • 1
  • Vicki L. Birchfield
    • 1
  1. 1.Sam Nunn School of International AffairsGeorgia Institute of TechnologyAtlantaUSA

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