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A Political Theory of Constitutional Democracy: On Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts in Stable Liberal Democracies

  • Pasquale Pasquino
Chapter

Abstract

My text offers an attempt to justify theoretically the existence of an important pillar of contemporary constitutional democracy: judicial review. Why do Supreme and Constitutional Courts that are not electorally accountable organs have the power to modify and occasionally cancel from the books statutory legislation passed by elected and accountable representatives? The argument presented discusses and questions the standard doctrine of the separation of powers and is based on the foundations of modern political authority as the agency the function of which is to protect and guarantee citizens’ rights.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pasquale Pasquino
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PoliticsNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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