How the Gulf Cooperation Council Responded to the Arab Spring

  • Gülşah Neslihan Akkaya


The uprising that erupted at the end of 2010 and spread to most of the Arab countries did not bring spring to the Middle East and North Africa region, as it was hoped at the beginning. International, regional, and local powers have all been tested in their sincerity of supporting the will of the people, their social and political demands and choices vis-à-vis their own national and global interests. After eight years, there is no actor or institution that is able to bring spring to the region; however, history records all the efforts or sets put up by all the actors. Despite the fact that its reputation falls behind some of its members and also that it suffers from internal crisis, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a subregional intergovernmental organization started to play more and more of a significant role diplomatically and economically in the region, especially after the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, in view of the challenges posed by regional unrest and the history of the organization, it is unlikely the organization will play a more active role. This study attempts to make a critical assessment of the GCC’s performance as a subregional organization during the regional turmoil and afterwards.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gülşah Neslihan Akkaya
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political Science and Public AdministrationAnkara Yıldırım Beyazıt UniversityAnkaraTurkey

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