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Confining Adversary Actions via Measurement

  • Paul D. RoweEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9987)

Abstract

Systems designed with measurement and attestation in mind are often layered, with the lower layers measuring the layers above them. Attestations of such systems must report the results of a diverse set of application-specific measurements of various parts of the system. There is a pervasive intuition that measuring the system “bottom-up” (i.e. measuring lower layers before the layers above them) is more robust than other orders of measurement. This is the core idea behind trusted boot processes. In this paper we justify this intuition by characterizing the adversary actions required to escape detection by bottom-up measurement. In support of that goal, we introduce a formal framework with a natural and intuitive graphical representation for reasoning about layered measurement systems.

Keywords

Virtual Machine Adversary Action Layered System Trust Platform Module Virtual Machine Monitor 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Pete Loscocco for suggesting and guiding the direction of this research. Many thanks also to Perry Alexander and Joshua Guttman. Their valuable feedback on during the formation of these ideas was invaluable. Thanks also to Sarah Helble and Aaron Pendergrass for lively discussions about implementations of measurement and attestation systems. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers as well as the GraMSec participants for their insightful comments and suggestions for improving the paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The MITRE CorporationBedfordUSA

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