Security Goals and Evolving Standards
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With security standards, as with software, we cannot expect to eliminate all security flaws prior to publication. Protocol standards are often updated because flaws are discovered after deployment. The constraints of the deployments, and variety of independent stakeholders, mean that different ways to mitigate a flaw may be proposed and debated.
In this paper, we propose a criterion for one mitigation to be at least as good as another from the point of view of security. This criterion is supported by rigorous protocol analysis tools. We also show that the same idea is applicable even when some approaches to mitigating the flaw require cooperation between the protocol and its application-level caller.
KeywordsSecurity Protocol Evolve Standard Expiration Time Security Goal Transport Layer Security
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