Meaning as Perception (Metaphysics)

  • Gaetano Fiorin
  • Denis Delfitto
Part of the Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology book series (PEPRPHPS, volume 25)


In this chapter, we further illustrate the thesis of meaning as perception by focusing on the domains of reference, propositional attitudes, and the implicit de se. We demonstrate that the thesis of meaning as perception offers the framework for addressing a number of linguistic puzzles including why linguistic reference is always bound to a cognitive perspective, how speakers manage to contemplate propositions and describe propositional attitudes, and, finally, how speakers manage to express, in language, inner feelings, sensations, and emotions. We conclude by discussing some of the limitations of the thesis.


Meaning as perception Reference Tracking Propositional attitudes Implicit de se Phenomenal consciousness 

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gaetano Fiorin
    • 1
  • Denis Delfitto
    • 2
  1. 1.Utrecht UniversityUtrechtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.University of VeronaVeronaItaly

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