Meaning and Acquaintance

  • Gaetano Fiorin
  • Denis Delfitto
Part of the Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology book series (PEPRPHPS, volume 25)


In this chapter, we introduce a definition of the notion of self-acquaintance that is based on the notion of acquaintance, which, in turn, is based on Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. We rely on such definition to enrich Kaplan’s two-dimensional semantics so that it can capture the cognitive dimensions expressed by de se propositions.


Knowledge by acquaintance Knowledge by description Self-acquaintance De se 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gaetano Fiorin
    • 1
  • Denis Delfitto
    • 2
  1. 1.Utrecht UniversityUtrechtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.University of VeronaVeronaItaly

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