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Benchmarking Post-quantum Cryptography in TLS

  • Christian Paquin
  • Douglas StebilaEmail author
  • Goutam Tamvada
Conference paper
  • 82 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 12100)

Abstract

Post-quantum cryptographic primitives have a range of trade-offs compared to traditional public key algorithms, either having slower computation or larger public keys and ciphertexts/signatures, or both. While the performance of these algorithms in isolation is easy to measure and has been a focus of optimization techniques, performance in realistic network conditions has been less studied. Google and Cloudflare have reported results from running experiments with post-quantum key exchange algorithms in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol with real users’ network traffic. Such experiments are highly realistic, but cannot be replicated without access to Internet-scale infrastructure, and do not allow for isolating the effect of individual network characteristics.

In this work, we develop and make use of a framework for running such experiments in TLS cheaply by emulating network conditions using the networking features of the Linux kernel. Our testbed allows us to independently control variables such as link latency and packet loss rate, and then examine the performance impact of various post-quantum-primitives on TLS connection establishment, specifically hybrid elliptic curve/post-quantum key exchange and post-quantum digital signatures, based on implementations from the Open Quantum Safe project. Among our key results, we observe that packet loss rates above 3–5% start to have a significant impact on post-quantum algorithms that fragment across many packets, such as those based on unstructured lattices. The results from this emulation framework are also complemented by results on the latency of loading entire web pages over TLS in real network conditions, which show that network latency hides most of the impact from algorithms with slower computations (such as supersingular isogenies).

Keywords

Post-quantum key exchange Post-quantum authentication Transport Layer Security (TLS) Network performance Emulation 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Eric Crockett for helpful discussions in the early parts of this work. We are grateful to Geovandro C. C. F. Pereira, Justin Tracey, and Nik Unger for their help with the network emulation experiments. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.

Contributors to the Open Quantum Safe project are listed on the project website [29]. The Open Quantum Safe project has received funding from Amazon Web Services and the Tutte Institute for Mathematics and Computing, and in-kind contributions of developer time from Amazon Web Services, Cisco Systems, evolutionQ, IBM Research, and Microsoft Research. The post-quantum algorithm implementations used in the experiments are directly or indirectly from the original NIST submission teams. Some implementations have been provided by the PQClean project [16].

D.S. is supported in part by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada Discovery grant RGPIN-2016-05146 and a NSERC Discovery Accelerator Supplement. Computation time on Azure was donated by Microsoft Research.

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian Paquin
    • 1
  • Douglas Stebila
    • 2
    Email author
  • Goutam Tamvada
    • 2
  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchRedmondUSA
  2. 2.University of WaterlooWaterlooCanada

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