PrivApollo – Secret Ballot E2E-V Internet Voting

  • Hua WuEmail author
  • Poorvi L. Vora
  • Filip Zagórski
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11599)


The Apollo voting protocol improves on the integrity properties of Helios by enabling voters to communicate to the public the failure of the cast-as-intended check, in the event that the voting terminal changes the vote on receiving the credential. It also enables the voter to detect a dishonest registrar and to prove misbehaviour. It provides an explicit description of the role of one or more computational voting assistants which help the voter perform the checks without obtaining information on the vote. Unfortunately, neither Helios nor Apollo provides ballot secrecy, because the voting terminal knows the vote. We present PrivApollo, a protocol that improves Apollo by providing ballot secrecy from the voting terminal.


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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceThe George Washington UniversityWashington, D.C.USA
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceWroclaw University of Science and TechnologyWroclawPoland

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