Legal Thinking

  • Jan M. BroekmanEmail author
  • Frank Fleerackers
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Law book series (BRIEFSLAW)


Indeed, a flow of information is like the life-ensuring breath we take in the woods, at the seashore or in the centre of our town. Those experiences vary with their surroundings and in particular with the other people creating spaces and thoughts. The jurist’s situation is not different, as this Brief suggests, and a first chapter on legal thinking unfolds. Continuity is the main feature of conversion; conversion the climate of re-thinking law. Attention pertains to the person who originates thoughts and ideas, and in his or her ingenuity needs other persons and institutions, norms and values as well as the drive to share what comes to the fore. Legal thoughts are thus unfolding and in this activity they convert. They do not simply add to what is there: their adding is not only a sharing but always also a conversion. Upcoming thoughts in law are not solely the result of what law students or judges, politicians or legal scholars have in mind: they do mainly stem from social experiences and existing thought patterns that are converted already in to law. Legal thoughts demonstrate simultaneousness and even entanglements rather than ordered chains of concepts and ideas. This is mirrored in the first chapter of this Brief—the multiple consequences of the gap between rule and reality with which the jurist is confronted. They determine his or her social position as well as the variety of theoretical viewpoints, so that interaction among them is needed and affectivity a requirement to bring converting legal thoughts to the fore.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of LawKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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