Antiscepticism and Easy Justification

  • Luca MorettiEmail author
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)


In this chapter I investigate the epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose it simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.


Phenomenal conservatism Reflective awareness Scepticism Responses to scepticism Easy justification Bootstrapping 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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