The Bayesian Objection

  • Luca MorettiEmail author
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)


In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that the objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with each another.


Phenomenal conservatism Bayesianism Perceptual justification Immediate and non-immediate justification Inferential and non-inferential justification  Reflective justification Reflective awareness 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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