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Phenomenal Conservatism

  • Luca MorettiEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

In this chapter I introduce and analyse the tenets of phenomenal conservatism, and discuss the problem of the nature of appearances. After that, I review the asserted epistemic merits of phenomenal conservatism and the principal arguments adduced in support of it. Finally, I survey objections to phenomenal conservatism and responses by its advocates. Some of these objections will be scrutinized and appraised in the next chapters.

Keywords

Phenomenal conservatism Epistemic justification Epistemic internalism Seemings Appearances Phenomenal force Rational commitment Huemer’s self-defeat argument Meta-justification 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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