Regional Integration, Borders and Development in Africa

  • Samuel O. OloruntobaEmail author
Part of the Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development book series (AAESPD)


At the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, previously existing kingdoms and nationalities in Africa were bifurcated into various micro states to serve the interests of the imperial powers. The borders that were created to separate the various states were both artificial and arbitrary as they did not reflect the existing geographical spaces that the various nationalities occupied before the bifurcation. Curiously, post-colonial African leaders decided at the 1964 Cairo Conference of the Organisation of African Unity to maintain these borders in order to protect the sovereignty of the newly independent states. The consequence of this singular decision has been wars and conflicts, especially at the border communities, on one hand, and the avoidable stifling of economic and social development on the other hand. This chapter examines the relationship between borders, regional integration and socio-economic development in Africa. It departs from previous scholarly interventions on this issue by interrogating the underlying philosophies behind the borders from the perspectives of both local and transnational elites. The chapter also transcends the preoccupation with analysing regional integration from purely economic considerations, to non-economic issues such as cultural integration and social interaction among people in the border communities. The chapter concludes that given the elite considerations that underpinned the creation and sustenance of these borders, regional integration, which will ensure the dismantling of the borders and foster socio-cultural penetration among Africans, is of utmost necessity.


Regional integration Borders Development Africa Economy 


Post-independent Africa has witnessed several border-related wars and conflicts. In many instances, these wars arose out of disputes over the arbitrary borders that the colonialists designed in areas occupied by people who had existed together as one ethnic group for centuries. At the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885, the imperial forces of Europe divided African countries among themselves. This was done to make it easy for the European powers to exploit, control and subjugate the African societies (Rodney, 1981). Besides, the division was also done as part of the peace process in war-torn Europe. Apart from wars and conflicts, scholars have established a causal link between underdevelopment in Africa and the rigidity of colonially deigned borders (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2017). The contradictions inherent in colonial borders have ensured that intra-Africa trade remains one of the least in the world today (Gibb, 2009). Zeleza (1993) argues, pre-colonial African societies achieved high levels of economic growth, built empires and were relatively well off on the back of free movement of people across the length and breadth of the continent. However, colonially designed borders have ensured that what is considered as informal cross-border trade receive little or no support from governments as the traders are criminalised. While post-colonial African leaders have made regional integration one of the identified paths towards achieving socio-economic development, it has not succeeded as expected due to several factors, not least the mimicry of European integration, lack of political will among the ruling elites to relinquish their national base of power, external influences and application of wrong theoretical models (Adedeji, 2012; Draper, 2013; Oloruntoba, 2018a). The inability of the state to respond or cope with both internal and external forces that are competing against its development has perpetuated the peripherisation, underdevelopment, poverty and general dependence of African countries on the rest of the world for ideas and assistance. While there have been narratives about Africa rising and a growing economy, the continent is host to the largest concentration of people living in poverty.

This chapter weaves the triple issues of regional integration, borders and development in Africa. After this introduction, the second section explicates on the origin and complexities of borders in Africa, while the third section attempts both historical and contemporary sketches of regional integration in its various forms and dimensions. Section four explicates on the challenges of borders, regional integration and development, while section five concludes.

African Borders: Origins, Forms and Politics

As indicated above, contemporary African borders were formed from the arbitrary decision of the imperial powers of Europe to bifurcate Africa and divide it among themselves (Adebajo, 2010). Before the epochal event of 1884–1885, African kingdoms had exited for centuries with fluid but traceable borders, usually determined by natural markers such as rivers, mountains, roads, etc. Asiwaju (1993) shows that people of the same language, history or linguistic similarities banded together in their search for development. Although scholars like Nugent would argue that the borders created by the colonialists are not arbitrary and indeed followed on the pre-colonial patterns of boundary formation (personal communication, 2016), the evidence of history and the real-life experiences of people contradict this revisionist argument. In their bid to avoid competition from locals over exploitation of African resources, the colonialists adopted various tactics, including divide and rule, lies, bribery and violence to apportion African land to themselves. The borders were delineated in Berlin without the knowledge of the cultures and ethnic composition of people who inhabited these lands. Gashaw (2017: 2) puts this into balanced perspective when he notes that

Artificial borders split many closely related ethnic groups into different colonial regions. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, they split Somalis into French Somaliland, British Somalia, Italian Somalia, Ethiopian Somalia, and the Somali region of northern Kenya. Such colonial borders have massive effects on Somali people who share a common culture, a similar way of life, and the same religion, but live as separate citizens of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Similarly, the Afar people of Ethiopia were split amongst Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, and the Anyuaa and Nuer were split between Ethiopia and South Sudan.

These patterns of forced splitting and forced marriage are found in different parts of Africa, including in Angola where the Portuguese forced people of disparate nationalities from three countries into Angola. As Fisher (2012) argues, “had pre-industrial-era Portuguese colonists not pressed so far up along Africa’s western coast so quickly, for example, then Africa’s seven million Kikongo-speakers might today have their own country. Instead, they are split among three different countries, including Angola, as minorities.” Yoruba people are divided among British-ruled Nigeria and French-ruled Benin Republic. Until the controversial decision of the International Court of Justice to hand over Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, the people living in that region were part of Nigeria. Beyond the accident of geography that these artificial borders represent are the more destructive and long-term mistrust, distrust and mutual hatred that they have created in the minds of Africans. The mental boundaries that are constructed in the minds of Africans have done significant damage to the socio-economic and political development of Africa before and after independence. Apart from the borderland areas that have been marginalised and subjected to several attacks, Africans are distant from each another through the construction of psychological otherness. Oblivious of the extent to which neo-imperial designs which manifest in the form of global capitalism and the war on terror in contemporary times have conditioned them to a subordinate position in the global hierarchy of power, Africans have been conditioned along mental boundaries to think that the other African, from across the border, is the one taking jobs and engaged in criminal behaviour. The decision of African leaders to keep the colonial boundaries at the Cairo Conference of 1964 has contributed to the perpetuation of what scholars have called bondage of boundaries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2012). Although the leaders decided to keep the colonially designed boundaries to avoid conflicts, that decision did not help to stem the tide of conflicts. Rather there are over 200 separatist groups that are campaigning for independence from the countries where they were forced to be by external powers. The Biafra War of Independence from 1967 to 1970 in Nigeria is a classic case.

Cases of Xenophobia have become rampant on the continent as locals who see other Africans as the other have risen up in arms and other forms of discriminations against fellow Africans (Neocosmos, 2010; Oloruntoba, 2018b). While the economically disadvantaged have been the face of such attacks, they usually have political foundations as political elites find it more convenient to blame others, especially African immigrants, for their lack of imagination, vision, discipline and commitment to socio-economic transformations in the lives of their people.

Nyamjoh (2006) chronicles the sense of insiders and outsiders in Southern Africa, especially South Africa and Botswana. Locals, who are excluded from economic opportunities, have felt threatened by the influx of other Africans. Rather than seeing their experiences of oppression and exploitation as similar in the global capitalist system, they engage in oppressing and exploiting these other Africans through different forms. As Prah (2010, 1999) argues, Africans also denigrate themselves by calling other Africans. For example, people from relatively developed economies in Southern Africa are fond of calling other Africans makwerekwere (people with unintelligible language). In South Africa, it has become politically correct to criminalise other Africans as being the brain behind everything that is wrong and illegal. While some part of the leadership of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) may be measured in making such xenophobic comments, that cannot be said of the nationalist oriented Democratic Alliance (DA). The Mayors of Tshwane and Johannesburg, Solly Msimanga and Herman Mashaba, leading members of this party, especially the latter, have incessantly made xenophobic statements against other Africans living in South Africa. While there could be merit to the accusations that other Africans are involved in criminality, crimes have no boundary. Such statements smack of generalisation and a demonstration of crisis of identity, especially when viewed against the backdrop of the fact that non-Africans in the country are generally spared of such categorisations, when indeed they may not be innocent.

It is precisely in the manner in which African leaders and some professional elite appropriate nation space for political ends that borders continue to constitute a serious hindrance to achieving African unity. Even though Anderson (1983) argues that the nation-state is an imagined community, it provides the basis of power, accumulation and influence. Thus, despite the glaring reality that the balkanisation of Africa into micro and dependent states had origin in the desire of the imperialists to keep Africans weak, divided and susceptible to further manipulation and exploitation, these leaders prefer to rule over debt-ridden, beggarly and dependent states than to genuinely commit themselves to the project of Pan-African unity. As scholars have argued, with very few exceptions, the neo-colonial state has become authoritarian, exploitative and distant from the people (Wariboko, 2002). The state is also used for patronage, to settle political scores and project personal aspirations at the expense of societal development.

The ruling elites in Africa and some intellectuals, professionals and bureaucrats are often united in the politics of narrow nationalism, exclusion and feelings of superiority over others. Whereas it might be convenient to express belief in the unity of the black race, Pan-Africanism and African solidarity, these feelings become secondary when issues of positions, appointments and opportunities in places of work are involved. In such instances, territoriality becomes a key factor: Africans from other parts of the continent are reminded of where they come from, either overtly or covertly. This tendency to express belief in one thing is not limited to Africans. As Fanon (1965) argues in relation to French Liberals, who claim to support democracy, these groups of people did little or nothing when the French forces were killing millions of Algerians and other Africans who were demanding for decolonisation in the 1950s–1960s. On the other hand, borders matter little for African elites when they need to get their companies to go to other countries on the continent. Whereas human mobility is usually constrained due to various phony excuses and hysteria feelings, capital is usually welcome with open arms.

Visa regimes for political and other professional elites who are considered less dangerous and less of a burden to the state are also relatively relaxed. The target of border restrictions and securitisation are the subaltern classes, who because of exclusions in their countries of origin are seeking for ways of improving their livelihood in other African countries. Gumede, Oloruntoba, and Kamga-Djoyou (2019) found out in a study of migration and regional integration in Africa that the mass of Africans in the lower classes want borders dismantled so that people can move freely across the continent.

To summarise, the politics of borders and its effects on regional integration and development in Africa cannot be divorced from the crisis of identity that the continent is facing today. In the absence of self-knowing, self-appraisal and self-critique, Africans continue to perpetuate the politics of difference, divide and rule, define and conquer that underpinned the imperial logic of partition of Africans in the nineteenth century. Today, as it was then, various countries in the developed and emerging economies are negotiating agreements on the basis of unequal relationship with small and incapable African states. From China to the European Union (EU), African countries are negotiating agreements that could further under-develop rather than develop them (Oloruntoba, 2018a; Soludo, 2012). While there is merit in the fact that Africa is made up of various disparate ethnic identities, different cultures and languages, this does not detract from the possibilities that an African identity can be born based on the consciousness of being African first before identifying with other markers of identity. What late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and President Paul Kagame did in post-independent Tanzania and post-Genocide Rwanda, respectively, attest to the possibility of building a state out of the multi-ethnic sub-nationalities. The reality of geopolitical configurations and considerations for geo-strategic interests that underpin the global capitalist system necessitate rethinking the current externally contrived borders in Africa. But to make this acceptable and meaningful, it must be based on the idea or philosophy of socio-economic and political freedom in which the dignity of Africans is restored. The next section provides an analysis of regional integration and its link to development in Africa.

African Experiences with Regional Integration: From the Past to the Present

Regional integration, broadly conceived as the voluntary surrender of some aspects of a state’s sovereignty to achieve larger political and economic objectives, has been at the core of development strategies in Africa since colonialism. Post-colonial leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Julius Nyerere believed that a Pan-African integration agenda is a sine qua non for positioning African countries to achieve development (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Nkrumah, 1963). Although these leaders could not agree on the sequence of integration, they had the understanding that given the structural composition of the global capitalist economies, the experiences of Africans under slave trade and colonialism, Africa had little or no chance to develop outside a cooperative arrangement. The ideas of regional integration and how it might lead to industrialisation occupied centre stage in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL). Subsections 1–3 of the Preamble to the text of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos state as follows:
  1. 1.

    We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples, to promote the economic and social development and integration of our economies with a view to achieving an increasing measure of self-sufficiency and self-sustainment.

  2. 2.

    We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples, to promote the economic integration of the African region in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse.

  3. 3.

    We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples, to establish national, sub-regional and regional institutions which will facilitate the attainment of objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment (Organisation of African Unity, 1980).


An analysis of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos shows that although the programme was very ambitious and indeed held great potential for the socio-economic transformation of the continent, it failed to achieve its objectives due to a combination of both domestic and external factors. At the domestic level, lack of national capacity for resource mobilisation made it impossible to fund the huge infrastructure needs that is required to achieve the integration objectives. At the external level, the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted at the same time that African countries began to experience economic crisis. The crisis provided opportunity for the International Financial Institutions to intervene in African economies. Rather than supporting the vision of African leaders as encapsulated under the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, the World Bank came up with the Berg Report, which laid the basis for the introduction of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Whereas the LPA had forged out clear roles for the State in terms of fostering industrialisation, providing social services and enhancing redistribution, the Berg Report sees the State as a hindrance to socio-economic development and made the case for the market to take the centre stage in allocation of resources (Adebajo, 2014; Adedeji, 2012).

The adoption of the SAPs marked the neoliberal turn in African economies. Thus, the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) that followed conceived regional integration basically from the perspective of market integration (Gibb, 2009). And as Draper (2013) would argue, African’s attempt at regional integration has tended to follow the European integration model.

Theoretically, Ballasa (1961) provides four stages through which regional integration can be achieved, namely (a) Free Trade Area, (b) Customs Union, (c) Monetary Union and (d) Political Union. Whereas the EU appears to have reached the final stage of integration, through the creation of various supranational institutions such as the European Parliament, European Court of Justice, European Investment Bank, single currency (except for four countries) and so on, each of the member states still have their own sovereignty. The rise of populist regimes in Europe has spurred right-wing movements that are now calling for the dismantling of the EU. The Brexit vote represents a classic case of the existential threat of that the EU is currently faced with. The contradictions between the market integration ideas that informed EU integration call for reflections on the path that African integration efforts have taken post-1980. The fracturing that the EU is faced with is largely informed by the fears that regional integration (free movement of people) is responsible for the threat to jobs that people from countries that are relatively developed are faced with due to what they call influx of migrants from less developed countries, even with the EU. As scholars have argued, the globalisation processes have excluded many people and nations that are not fully prepared for it. Trade and investment regimes and the overall liberalisation of the global markets have ensured that capital have more value than human beings. Thus, the reaction of people to regional integration efforts in developed countries is borne out of this sense of exclusion.

As noted above, the feeling of exclusion and the fears that migrants will take over available opportunities have underpinned the increased territorial thinking in different parts of Africa. It might be necessary to rethink regional integration away from its neoliberal foundation. In the case of Africa, this is of utmost importance in the light of the need to pool resources and build synergy while relating with negotiating trade and investment agreements with other parts of the world.

Following the Abuja Treaty of 1991, the African Union (AU) recognised eight regional economic communities through which the continent will arrive at a full economic and political integration. These include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (ECA), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD. These organisations are to serve as building blocks to the realisation of African integration. They are also part of the AU Agenda 2063. Perhaps due to the relatively stronger economic capacity of two regional hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa, in West and Southern Africa, ECOWAS and SADC have been the most active of the regional economic organisations. From the intervention of ECOWAS, through its military arm, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), this regional organisation has played important roles in fostering peace and security and promoting the norms of democracy in the sub-region (Adebajo, 2002; Olonisakin, 2008). SADC has also played significant roles in resolving political logjams in countries such as Lesotho and Zimbabwe. In the wake of the escalation of terrorist attacks from Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and its environs, regional approach has also been taken to tackling the challenges of insurgency in West Africa. The formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force is a regional approach to solving this challenge.

Despite the relative success that has been achieved by regional economic communities (RECs) in the promotion of peace and security in the sub-region, economic integration among and between the RECs has been below the expected volume. As the figure below shows, intra-Africa trade in general is much lower than other regions.

The new African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which was signed and ratified by the required number of member states of the AU in April 2019, is a crystallisation of various processes geared towards the actualisation of regional integration and creation of African Economic Community (African Union, 2018). AfCFTA goes beyond the promotion of intra-African trade in commodities to exports of processed goods, services as well as ensuring free movement of people across the continent. The overall aim is to ensure structural transformation through the creation of regional value chains and preparation of African countries to participate in the global value chains (ECA, 2018). With an estimated population of 1.2 billion and a projected population of 2.5 billion people by 2050, a well-integrated African market with strong industrial capacity can enhance growth and prosperity of the continent. However, for this to be done, there is a need to overcome the perennial challenges that have adversely affected regional integration in Africa. To this we now turn.

Challenges to Regional Integration

The nature and the character of the state in Africa makes regional integration a compelling force for structural transformation and the repositioning of Africa in the global capitalist economy. Despite the rhetoric around this subject matter, there are challenges that have continued to hamper its realisation. First is the model of integration that has been adopted in Africa. As noted above, African countries have tried to mimic the EU model of regional integration by advocating creation of market access for goods and services to the detriment of cultural exchanges, mutual understanding of our shared identity as Africans and the expected benefits of integration. Because regional integration is located within the neoliberal capitalist system, which care little for the welfare of the people, political elites in Africa eill continue to adopt a top-down approach. As noted above, African political and bureaucratic elites work in tandem with other members of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) to accumulate profits and rents under the current regime of primitive capitalist accumulation. Thus, their overall agenda is to function within this regime through the nation-space. Consequently, there is no incentive for these elites to concede parts of the powers and privileges that they enjoy at the national level. Regardless of the weakness of this state and the resultant inability to exercise sovereign functions, the elites are satisfied with the rhetoric of regional integration, especially within the confines of market ideas.

The absence of incentives to surrender part of the sovereignty is linked to the next challenge: lack of political will on regional integration is evident in the treaties and protocols that have been signed but are not implemented, both at the regional and continental levels. In ECOWAS, for instance, whereas the Protocol on Free Movement of People and Rights of Establishment works relatively well, there have been cases of other Africans being attacked or their businesses seized in some countries that are signatories to such Protocols. The recent cases in which Ghana clamped down on Nigerian businesses raised start-up capital for foreigners to about three hundred thousand dollars and deport other Africans attest to this breach in Protocol. As mentioned above, in the case of South Africa, attacks on other African nationals, especially those who live in the township, have become commonplace (Shireen, Tawana, Eric, & Alon, 2008).

Linked to the absence of political will as one of the challenges of regional integration in Africa is crisis of identity (Oloruntoba, 2018c). Crisis of identity manifests in lack of self-knowledge of Africans. It is also a demonstration of the lack of appreciation of their collective fortune in the global hierarchy of power. It is not uncommon to find one state in Africa competing with other states and actually feeling that they are better than the others, sometimes on account of the level of acceptance that they have with the others. Even at international fora, it is not uncommon to find African countries take sides with former colonisers against fellow Africans. The crisis of identity shows how difficult it is for Africa to unite and take common positions in critical matters that affect the development and the survival of the continent in an intensely competitive global environment. This crisis also shows in the ease with which non-Africans are able to enter other African countries either for leisure or for business. It would appear that there is a psychological conditioning of Africans to have self-hate and aversion for themselves. This conditioning has a long historical trajectory starting from the period of slave trade, in which slave merchants incentivised Africans to hunt after one another. The commoditisation of life and the destruction of sense of community and bonding that had defined African value system had its foundation in slave trade but have now become accentuated through market-induced neoliberal individualism, and, what Chomsky calls, consumerism and exhibitionism (Chomsky & Barsama, 2017). The preoccupation with self and the ideational pursuit of accumulation without regard to how the society is affected have undermined the commitment of African elites to the project of integration.

Apart from the economic and cultural challenges narrated above, there are economic factors, such as inadequate infrastructure, landlocked countries, insufficient domestic technical and analytical capacity, dependence on external financing, narrow production base, overlapping membership of regional integration arrangements and external interferences as well as lack of synergy of national policies with the objectives of African Economic Community (ECA, 2004; Qobo, 2007).

In terms of infrastructures, travelling within Africa remains a big challenge as rail lines and road networks are poorly connected. Air travels might have been improving, but it is still difficult to connect from smaller countries in West Africa to East as well as Southern Africa. In cases where the road networks are relatively good, such as in Sothern Africa, road blocks and delays at the borders hinder free flow of goods and services (Jerome & Nabena, 2016). Due to lack of well-developed seaports and shores, importation of goods through the sea continues to be a disincentive to intra-African trade. Goods imported from one part of the continent to the other might have to be re-exported through other countries, which makes it cheaper to import outside Africa than within the continent.

The inability to connect cultural exchanges and connections to the project of regional integration at the policy level also affects the practicality of integration in Africa. Although there are currently such exchanges among Nollywood actors, Musicians, Sports and so on, these have not been deliberately incorporated into the regional integration agenda. Yet, people-to-people integration could be a fundamental requirement for integration over and above market-induced integration in Africa.

Lastly, the exclusion of the informal sector from integration agenda remains another challenge to the realisation of huge potentials that are inherent in this process for economic development in Africa. In a special issue of Africa Insight on borders, informality and regional integration edited by the trio of Nshimbi, Moyo, and Oloruntoba (2018), the importance of the informal economy and its link to regional integration was brought into focus. The informal sector constitutes a considerable part of the African economy, contributing over 40% of job creation in a country like Zimbabwe (Chirisa, 2015). In this context, informal cross-border trade contributes to livelihood for women in different parts of the continent (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2017). Rather than focusing all attention to how companies can export goods and services from one part of Africa to the other, it is imperative to conduct more research on the contributions of the informal sector to regional integration. Additionally, rather than criminalising informal-cross border traders, substantial support should be provided at both national and regional levels. If development is defined in terms of improved welfare, capability and voice (Sen, 2001), then, by providing employment for millions of Africans, both educated and uneducated, the informal sector is helping to achieve development outcomes. A deliberate linkage between the regional integration agenda and this sector will provide a different outcome in terms of the volume of intra-African trade as well as the potentials for achieving socio-economic development (World Bank, 2012).

Conclusion: Linking Borders, Regional Integration and Development in Africa

This chapter departs from the existing literature on borders and regional integration by reframing the debate to include the historical, identity and non-formal part of the discourse. I argue that given the location of Africa in the global capitalist order, none of the states on the continent can exist meaningfully and achieve development without integrating in one way or another with other states. Even though post-independence African leaders are aware of this reality and have indeed taken some steps towards this end, the combination of historical forces and events which altered the mode of social relations among Africans, the entrapment within the global imperial design which is ensconced under neoliberal market ideology, preoccupation with self-survival and accumulation have rendered the project of regional integration ineffective. Thus, it becomes imperative to restructure the epistemological and ontological basis of relationships among Africans, in ways that reshape and redefine the current predisposition to both mental and physical boundaries. Beyond the pursuit of market integration through formal business enterprises, a conscious effort should be made to incorporate culture and the informal sector into the regional integration agenda on the continent. In this connection, solving the problem of identity and the associated crisis will foster new thinking about the ways in which Africans can relate among themselves. Achieving economic integration without conscious effort at achieving social and political integration will produce a sub-optimal outcome as it has been over the past five decades of gaining political independence.


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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Thabo Mbeki African Leadership InstituteUniversity of South AfricaPretoriaSouth Africa

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