Advertisement

Why Do US Judges Reject Antitrust Experts?

  • Nicola GiocoliEmail author
Chapter
  • 7 Downloads
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Institutions, Economics and Law book series (PSIEL)

Abstract

Economists regularly appear as expert witnesses in antitrust litigations. The chapter analyzes how their models and methodologies have performed vis-à-vis the standards of relevance and reliability affirmed by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. (1993). New data are provided on the number of antitrust economists whose expert testimonies have not survived a Daubert challenge. Explanations for such a poor record range from the judges’ insufficient economic literacy to skewed procedural rules, from the high specificity of antitrust cases to widespread identification problems in economic models.

Keywords

Antitrust Daubert Economists as experts Identification problem Judges’ economic literacy 

References

  1. Baker, Jonathan B., and Timothy F. Bresnahan. 2008. Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power. In Handbook of Antitrust Economics, ed. Paolo Buccirossi, 1–42. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  2. Baker, Jonathan B., and M. Howard Morse. 2006. Final Report of Economic Evidence Task Force. American Bar Association. Accessed September 4, 2017. www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/antitrust/at-reports/01_c_ii.authcheckdam.pdf.
  3. Baye, Michael R., and Joshua D. Wright. 2011. Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals. Journal of Law and Economics 54: 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Brandts, Jordi, and Jan Potter. 2018. Experimental Industrial Organization. In Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II. Applications, ed. Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini, 453–474. Cheltenham: Elgar.Google Scholar
  5. Bronsteen, Peter, and Asim Varma. 2001. Daubert Rules of Economists. Antitrust 15: 14–16.Google Scholar
  6. Broulík, Jan. 2020. What is Forensic Economics? In Economics in Legal Reasoning, ed. Péter Cserne and Fabrizio Esposito, 83–99. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
  7. Coate, Malcolm B., and Jeffrey H. Fischer. 2012. Daubert, Science, and Modern Game Theory: Implications for Merger Analysis. Supreme Court Economic Review 20: 125–182.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Gavil, Andrew I. 2000. Defining Reliable Forensic Economics in the Post-Daubert/Kumho Tire Era: Case Studies from Antitrust. Washington & Lee Law Review 57: 831–878.Google Scholar
  9. ———. 2001. Daubert Comes of Age. Antitrust 15: 6.Google Scholar
  10. Giocoli, Nicola. 2020. Rejected! Antitrust Economists as Expert Witnesses in the Post-Daubert world. Journal of the History of Economic Thought (forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1053837219000671.
  11. Holt, Charles A. 1995. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research. In Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. John Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, 349–443. Princeton: Princeton UP.Google Scholar
  12. Langenfeld, James, and Christopher Alexander. 2011. Daubert and Other Gatekeeping Challenges of Antitrust Experts. Antitrust 25: 21–28 and Appendix.Google Scholar
  13. Mandel, Michael J. 1999. Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses. Journal of Economic Perspectives 13: 113–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Schinkel, Maarten P. 2008. Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement. Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4: 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Solow, John L., and Daniel Fletcher. 2006. Doing Good Economics in the Courtroom: Thoughts on Daubert and Expert Testimony in Antitrust. Journal of Corporation Law 31: 489–502.Google Scholar
  16. Werden, Gregory J. 2008. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony. In Issues in Competition Law and Policy, vol. I, 801–817. American Bar Association—Section of Antitrust Law.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PisaPisaItaly

Personalised recommendations