Sovereign Borrowing and Debt: Legal Implications

  • Rumu Sarkar


The following discussion of the international financial architecture explores four separate areas of international finance that are fundamentally interconnected: international borrowing practices, privatization, emerging capital economies, and the corruption of international capital markets. Considered together, these are the fundamental aspects of the underlying international financial architecture that supports (and undercuts) the development process globally. From a larger perspective, this part of the text is also dedicated to the idea of structural legal reform. Accordingly, this section focuses on global finance and the underlying legal structures that support it (or not, as the case may be). Changes in the legal architecture greatly affect the process and potential success of development, and the state plays a pivotal role in this.


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© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rumu Sarkar
    • 1
  1. 1.General CounselMillennium PartnersCharlottesvilleUSA

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