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Introduction

  • Sümeyye Parıldar
Chapter
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Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 24)

Abstract

This is a book about Mulla Sadra’s ideas of soul, existence and perception constructed around the problem of intentionality as the problem is posited by Brentano. Intentionality is presented as a revival of medieval discussions, and according to Brentano it is the characteristic of what mental is. The intentionality problem is that every mental phenomena manifest a common characteristic which separates them from physical phenomena. The introductory chapter gives a general description of Brentano’s problem of intentionality together with its journey in the post-Brentano philosophy. The following chapters discuss intentionality problem on the basis posited in the first chapter and intentionality problem is translated into medieval discussions on the soul and its immateriality, on soul as a general term for various faculties, on mental existence and on perception.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sümeyye Parıldar
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Islamic Philosophyİstanbul UniversityİstanbulTurkey

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