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Compliance with Corporate Governance Best Practice: The Evidence from Polish Listed Companies

  • Maria AluchnaEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance book series (CSEG)

Abstract

The idea of best practice code was introduced with the 1992 Cadbury Report and since then has had a tremendous impact on the development of corporate governance standards, practice and disclosure. Codes of best practice defined as the voluntary set of principles and recommendations relating to internal corporate governance play an important role in emerging and post-transition countries as they set guidelines and improve standards of board independence and transparency.

This chapter addresses the issue of compliance with the code of corporate governance by companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Analyzing the data on board characteristics of 160 non-financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in years 2006–2015 it aims to identify the practice of corporate governance in Poland looking as the board characteristics with respect to the adoption of corporate governance guidelines practice on the presence of independent and female directors as well as forming specialized audit and remuneration committees.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Warsaw School of EconomicsWarsawPoland

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