IT Security for Measuring Instruments: Confidential Checking of Software Functionality

  • Daniel PetersEmail author
  • Artem Yurchenko
  • Wilson Melo
  • Katsuhiro Shirono
  • Takashi Usuda
  • Jean-Pierre Seifert
  • Florian Thiel
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 1129)


Legally supervised measuring instruments, like supermarket scales or utility meters for the supply of electricity, to name just a few, need to be checked in most countries. In this regard, smart meters are a fitting example for distributed systems that need to fulfill many IT security requirements. It is of utterly importance to make sure that the functionality of these measuring devices is preserved, with the goal to enhance trust in the market, protect the consumer of fraud, and preserve privacy. Normally, legally controlled measuring devices are checked before commissioning by so-called Notified Bodies, and afterwards cyclically by market surveillance officers. The hardware is scrutinized by manually testing the sensors. This paper looks more closely at the software testing aspect and highlights how current methods can be enhanced to check correct software functionality. We describe alternatives that will pave the way to a more secure and trustworthy market, which additionally, grants more flexibility to patch software bugs without the need for recertification, as long as the core functionality of the device remains the same. In our framework the functionality checking can be done automatically, while preserving confidentiality on all ends. Based on this framework, it is no problem to allow remote displays, e.g., smartphones, or, a completely distributed measuring instrument, e.g., with many sensors in different locations connected over the Internet. Our approach is of general nature, but perhaps most interesting for smart meter infrastructures.


Smart meters Metrology cloud Software integrity checking Homomorphic encryption Functional encryption Probabilistically checkable proofs Legal metrology Blockchain technology 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Peters
    • 1
    Email author
  • Artem Yurchenko
    • 1
  • Wilson Melo
    • 2
  • Katsuhiro Shirono
    • 3
  • Takashi Usuda
    • 3
  • Jean-Pierre Seifert
    • 4
  • Florian Thiel
    • 1
  1. 1.Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB)BerlinGermany
  2. 2.National Institute of Metrology (INMETRO), Quality and TechnologyRio de JaneiroBrazil
  3. 3.National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)TsukubaJapan
  4. 4.Security in TelecommunicationsTechnical University BerlinBerlinGermany

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