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Realism

  • Roberto Gronda
Chapter
  • 22 Downloads
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 421)

Abstract

This chapter deals with the issue of scientific realism. Traditionally, Dewey’s philosophy of science has been considered as a prototypical form of instrumentalism. On the contrary, I think Dewey is a scientific realist. My aim is to figure out what kind of scientific realism he embraces and defends in his texts. I reject the interpretation that Dewey’s scientific realism is a form of structural realism. Relying on the conclusions reached in the previous chapters, I outline the main features of what I call Dewey’s articulative realism, whose key assumption is the idea that the commitment to the existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories is a matter of the kind of activities that an agent is capable of undertaking.

Keywords

Instrumentalism Ontological commitment Scientific objects Structural realism Structure Connection Relation Language Formulation Articulative realism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Gronda
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del SapereUniversità di PisaPisaItaly

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