False Beliefs and the Social Structure of Science: Some Models and Case Studies

  • Cailin O’ConnorEmail author
  • James Owen Weatherall


We use models and historical cases to try and understand some of the ways scientific beliefs can go wrong. In particular, we consider questions like: how do conformity and social trust influence the spread of beliefs? What is the ideal network structure for a scientific community? And how do industrial propagandists influence the progress of science, as well as public belief?


Industrial propaganda Conformity Social trust Epistemology Zollman effect Polarization 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Logic and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of California IrvineIrvineUSA

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