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Theories and Theoretical Contribution

  • Laura Mae Jacqueline Herzog
Chapter
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Abstract

The chapter discusses different streams of literature that have treated the phenomenon of cooperation. Social action in general and cooperation in particular has been researched on by different disciplines and for several decades. For instance, social capital theory discusses the social norms and actors’ self-interest that shape their actions (Coleman, Am J Sociol 94:S95–S120, 1988); resource dependence theory claims that the social context and interdependencies, understood as power relations and dependencies between organizations, constrain an organization’s behavior and actions (Casciaro and Piskorski, Adm Sci Q 50:167–199, 2005; Pfeffer and Salancik, The external control of organizations: a resource dependence perspective. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1978); and theory on transaction costs has highlighted the necessity of possessing sufficient resources to meet the costs arising from cooperation (Taylor and Singleton, Polit Soc 21(2):195–214, 1993).

In this chapter, I reflect upon the key theoretical concepts of cooperation from sociology and political science that reach into the research domain on common-pool resources. Based on the literature review, I identify a research gap on the topic of cooperation in CPR problem situations. I close this research gap by outlining theoretical explanations for cooperation in the context of CPR problems. I draw these theoretical insights from the ecology of games framework (EGF), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and studies on environmental problem perception.

Keywords

Cooperation Collective action Tragedy of the commons Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) Ecology of games framework (EGF) Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 

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Authors and Affiliations

  • Laura Mae Jacqueline Herzog
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Environmental Systems ResearchOsnabrück UniversityOsnabrückGermany

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