Advertisement

A Note on Stumpf’s History of Active Intellection

  • Hamid TaiebEmail author
Chapter
  • 12 Downloads
Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 23)

Abstract

Carl Stumpf, in his Spinozastudien, presents the Aristotelico-Scholastic thesis of the “parallelism” between mental acts and contents, i.e., the thesis that “the essential differences and divisions of the acts run in parallel to those of the contents, since they are determined in their specificity by the latter.” In his paper, Stumpf also distinguishes between passive and active accounts of intellection in the history of philosophy. Now, Stumpf, in his own theory of intentionality, has rather an active account of intellection: he holds that the contents of abstract presentations and judgments are “products” of these acts. Stumpf does not explicitly give a historical precedent for his position. In this note, I would like to discuss Stumpf’s historical narrative concerning the active accounts of intellection, as well as to complete this narrative with information about some prior philosophical positions resembling Stumpf’s own views on psychic products.

References

  1. Aho, T. (2007). Suarez on cognitive intentions. In P. J. J. Bakker & H. Thijssen (Eds.), Mind, perception, and cognition. The commentary tradition of Aristotle’s De Anima (pp. 179–203). Aldershot: Ashgate.Google Scholar
  2. Augustine (1968). In W. J. Mountain (Ed.), De Trinitate libri XV. Turnhout: Brepols.Google Scholar
  3. Brentano, F. (1867). Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom NOUS POIETICOS. Mainz: Franz Kirchheim.Google Scholar
  4. Brentano, F. (1924). In O. Kraus (Ed.), Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Vol. 1). Leipzig: Felix Meiner.Google Scholar
  5. Brentano, F. (1980). In K. Hedwig (Ed.), Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie im christlichen Abendland. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Brentano, F. (1982). In R. M. Chisholm & W. Baumgartner (Eds.), Deskriptive psychologie. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Brentano, F. (1986). In R. George (Ed.), Über Aristoteles. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Brentano, F. (2013). In G. Fr´echette (Ed.), Abstraction und Relation; In D. Fisette & G. Fr´echette (Eds.), Themes from Brentano (pp. 465–482). Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  9. Bühler, K. (1908a). [Beschprechung von] C. Stumpf, Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen. Abh. der Berl. Akad., phil-hist. Kl. 1906. Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, 11 (Literaturbericht), 1–5.Google Scholar
  10. Bühler, K. (1908b). Antwort auf die von W. Wundt erhobenen Einwände gegen die Methode der Selbstbeobachtung an experimentell erzeugten Erlebnissen. Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, 12, 93–123.Google Scholar
  11. Bühler, K. (1933). Die Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften. Kant-Studien, 38, 19–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Burns, J. P. (1964). Action in Su´arez. The New Scholasticism, 38, 453–472.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Caston, V. (2001). Augustine and the Greeks on intentionality. In D. Perler (Ed.), Ancient and medieval theories of intentionality (pp. 23–48). Leiden: Brill.Google Scholar
  14. Cesalli, L. & Friedrich, J. (Eds.). (2014). Anton Marty and Karl Bühler. Between mind and language. Basel: Schwabe.Google Scholar
  15. Chrudzimski, A. (2015). Carl Stumpf über Sachverhalte. In D. Fisette & R. Martinelli (Eds.), Philosophy from an empirical standpoint. Essays on Carl Stumpf (pp. 173–202). Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  16. Cross, R. (2014). Duns Scotus’s theory of cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Dewalque, A. (2013). Schema of the Brentano School intellectual progeny. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12, 445.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Duns Scotus, J. (1950). In Commissio Scotistica (Ed.), Opera omnia (20 vol.). Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis.Google Scholar
  19. Duns Scotus, J. (1968). In F. Alluntis (Ed.), Cuestiones cuodlibetales. Madrid: La Editorial Cat´olica.Google Scholar
  20. Fisette, D. (2014). Ph´enom`enes sensibles et fonctions psychiques: Karl Bühler et le programme de Stumpf. In L. Cesalli & J. Friedrich (Eds.), Anton Marty and Karl Bühler. Between mind and language (pp. 103–140). Basel: Schwabe.Google Scholar
  21. Fisette, D. & Martinelli, R. (Eds.). (2015). Philosophy from an empirical standpoint. Essays on Carl Stumpf. Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  22. Fr´echette, G. (2015a). Essential laws. On ideal objects and their properties in early phenomenology. In B. Leclercq, S. Richard, & D. Seron (Eds.), Objects and pseudo-objects. Ontological deserts and jungles from Brentano to Carnap (pp. 143–166). Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter-Ontos.Google Scholar
  23. Fr´echette, G. (2015b). Stumpf on abstraction. In D. Fisette & R. Martinelli (Eds.), Philosophy from an empirical standpoint. Essays on Carl Stumpf (pp. 263–292). Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  24. Hedwig, K. (1980). Zur Textgestaltung der Ausgabe. In K. Hedwig (Ed.), Franz Brentano. Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie im christlichen Abendland (pp. XXII–XXIV). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.Google Scholar
  25. Husserl, E. (1974). In P. Janssen (Ed.), Formale and transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (Husserliana XVII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.Google Scholar
  26. Ingarden, R. (1931). Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft. Halle: Max Niemeyer.Google Scholar
  27. Lec´on, M. (2013). Francis Su´arez on the efficiency of substantial forms. Review of Metaphysics, 67, 107–124.Google Scholar
  28. Lonergan, B. (1967). In D. B. Burrell (Ed.), Verbum: Word and idea in Aquinas. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press; Re-edition in: B. J. F. Lonergan. In F.E. Crowe & R.M. Doran (Eds.), Collected works of Bernard Lonergan. Vol. 2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
  29. Martinelli, R. (2001). Intenzionalit`a della sostanza. Carl Stumpf interprete di Spinoza. Discipline Filosofiche, 11, 399–426.Google Scholar
  30. Martinelli, R. (2011). Intentionality and God’s mind: Stumpf on Spinoza. In G.-J. Boudewijnse & S. Bonacchi (Eds.), Carl Stumpf. From philosophical reflection to interdisciplinary scientific investigation (pp. 51–67). Wien: Krammer.Google Scholar
  31. Perler, D. (2002). Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.Google Scholar
  32. Plato (1900–1907), In J. Burnet (Ed.), Opera (4 vol.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  33. Pini, G. (2015). Two models of thinking. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on occurrent thoughts. In G. Klima (Ed.), Intentionality, cognition and mental representation in medieval philosophy (pp. 81–103). New York: Fordham University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Reinach, A. (1989). Zum Begriff der Zahl (1913/1914). In K. Schuhmann & B. Smith (Eds.), Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe (Vol. 1, pp. 515–527). Munich: Philosophia Verlag.Google Scholar
  35. Schuhmann, K. (1987). Johannes Dauberts Kritik der ‘Theorie des negativen Urteils’ von Adolf Reinach. In K. Mulligan (Ed.), Speech act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology (pp. 227–238). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Sol`ere, J.-L. (2007). Tension et intention. Esquisse de l’histoire d’une notion. In L. Couloubaritsis & A. Mazz`u (Eds.), Questions sur l’intentionnalitˊe (pp. 59–124). Bruxelles: Ousia.Google Scholar
  37. Spinoza (1925–1987). In C. Gebhardt (Ed.), Opera (5 vol.). Heidelberg: Carl Winter.Google Scholar
  38. Stöckl, A. (1865). Geschichte der Philosophie Des Mittelalters (3 vol.). Mainz: Franz Kirchheim.Google Scholar
  39. Stumpf, C. (1869). Verhältnis des platonischen Gottes zur Idee des Guten. Halle: C.E.M. Pfeffer.Google Scholar
  40. Stumpf, C. (1883–1890). Tonpsychologie (2 vol.). Leipzig: S. Hirzel.Google Scholar
  41. Stumpf, C. (1902). Über Abstraction und Generalisation. Sitzungsberichte der königlich-preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, XXVII, 593.Google Scholar
  42. Stumpf, C. (1906). Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen. Abhandlungen der königlich-preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (pp. 3–40). Berlin: Verlag der königlich Akademie der Wissenschaften.Google Scholar
  43. Stumpf, C. (1907). Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften. Abhandlungen der königlich-preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (pp. 1–94). Berlin: Verlag der königlich Akademie der Wissenschaften.Google Scholar
  44. Stumpf, C. (1919a). Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano. In O. Kraus (Ed.), Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre (pp. 87–149). München: C. H. Beck.Google Scholar
  45. Stumpf, C. (1919b). Spinozastudien. Abhandlungen der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 4, 1–57.Google Scholar
  46. Stumpf, C. (1924). Carl Stumpf. In R. Schmidt (Ed.), Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellung (Vol. 5, pp. 1–61). Leipzig: Felix Meiner.Google Scholar
  47. Stumpf, C. (1939–1940). Erkenntnislehre (2 vol.). Leipzig: J. A. Barth.Google Scholar
  48. Taieb, H. (2018). Building objective thoughts: Stumpf, Twardowski and the late Husserl on psychic products. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 100, 336–370.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Twardowski, K. (1996). In J. Brandl (Ed.), Funktionen und Gebilde. Conceptus, 39, 157–189.Google Scholar
  50. Witasek, S. (1908). Grundlinien der Psychologie. Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr’schen Buchhandlung.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of HamburgHamburgGermany

Personalised recommendations