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Challenges for Risk and Security Modelling in Enterprise Architecture

  • Gudmund GrovEmail author
  • Federico Mancini
  • Elsie Margrethe Staff Mestl
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing book series (LNBIP, volume 369)

Abstract

From our experience cooperating with the Norwegian Armed Forces, we outline two interconnected challenges for modelling risk and security in an enterprise architecture: (1) modelling what is protected and why it is protected with sufficient detail whilst being simple enough to facilitate analysis; and (2) establishing automated support for analysing and reasoning about the security models, something we deem crucial to exploit the full potential of an enterprise security architecture. In addition, we sketch out our approach to tackle these challenges and outline our future direction of work.

Keywords

Enterprise security architecture Diagrammatic risk and security modelling Automated reasoning 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gudmund Grov
    • 1
    Email author
  • Federico Mancini
    • 1
  • Elsie Margrethe Staff Mestl
    • 1
  1. 1.The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)KjellerNorway

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