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Sponges Resist Leakage: The Case of Authenticated Encryption

  • Jean Paul DegabrieleEmail author
  • Christian Janson
  • Patrick Struck
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11922)

Abstract

In this work we advance the study of leakage-resilient Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) and lay the theoretical groundwork for building such schemes from sponges. Building on the work of Barwell et al. (ASIACRYPT 2017), we reduce the problem of constructing leakage-resilient AEAD schemes to that of building fixed-input-length function families that retain pseudorandomness and unpredictability in the presence of leakage. Notably, neither property is implied by the other in the leakage-resilient setting. We then show that such a function family can be combined with standard primitives, namely a pseudorandom generator and a collision-resistant hash, to yield a nonce-based AEAD scheme. In addition, our construction is quite efficient in that it requires only two calls to this leakage-resilient function per encryption or decryption call. This construction can be instantiated entirely from the T-sponge to yield a concrete AEAD scheme which we call \({ \textsc {Slae}}\). We prove this sponge-based instantiation secure in the non-adaptive leakage setting. \({ \textsc {Slae}}\) bears many similarities and is indeed inspired by \({ \textsc {Isap}}\), which was proposed by Dobraunig et al. at FSE 2017. However, while retaining most of the practical advantages of \({ \textsc {Isap}}\), \({ \textsc {Slae}}\) additionally benefits from a formal security treatment.

Keywords

AEAD Leakage Resilience Side channels SLAE ISAP 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We thank Daniel Baur and Christian Schuller for initial discussions during the early stages of this project, and our anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. Degabriele was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) as well as by the Hessian State Ministry for Higher Education, Research and Arts (HMWK) within CRISP. Janson was co-funded by the DFG as part of project P2 within the CRC 1119 CROSSING. Struck was funded by the DFG as part of project P1 within the CRC 1119 CROSSING.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean Paul Degabriele
    • 1
    Email author
  • Christian Janson
    • 2
  • Patrick Struck
    • 3
  1. 1.CNSTechnische Universität DarmstadtDarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.CryptoplexityTechnische Universität DarmstadtDarmstadtGermany
  3. 3.CDCTechnische Universität DarmstadtDarmstadtGermany

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