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Other Specific Tasks and Competences of the European Central Bank Relating to Financial Stability

  • Christos V. Gortsos
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Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)

Abstract

This chapter elaborates on the other specific tasks and competences of the European Central Bank (ECB) relating to financial stability. Its specific tasks in the context of the European Systemic Risk Board are discussed in the first section, while the second deals with the limited, albeit important competences of the ECB within the Single Resolution Mechanism, drawing attention to its role in relation to resolution planning and early intervention, the conditions for resolution within the resolution procedure and, in particular, its role in determining that a credit institution is ‘failing or likely to fail’, as well as to the write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments. Finally, the third section discusses the (still) limited role of the ECB in the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) mechanism in respect of last-resort lending to credit institutions in the euro area, which permits the conclusion that the provision of ELA is not considered to be part of the single monetary policy in the euro area and falls under the main responsibility of the national central banks concerned.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christos V. Gortsos
    • 1
  1. 1.Law SchoolNational and Kapodistrian University of AthensAthensGreece

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