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Objections to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument

  • Kirk LougheedEmail author
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Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 51)

Abstract

In this chapter I outline and respond to a number of objections to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument. I begin with what I take to be the weakest objections and conclude with the strongest objections. The most promising objection to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument is that it conflates practical reasons with epistemic reasons. I respond to this by arguing that future epistemic benefits should indeed be considered benefits of epistemic reasoning. But the objection succeeds only if synchronic epistemic reasons are the only type of epistemic reasons included in one’s account of epistemic rationality. But an all-things-considered epistemic rationality will include both synchronic and diachronic epistemic reasons.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Concordia University of EdmontonEdmontonCanada

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