An Analysis of Ideal Cases of Disagreement
In the epistemology of disagreement literature, many authors use certain cases of disagreement in order to lend support to either conciliationism or non-conciliationism. Richard Feldman and David Christensen, among others, are advocates of the view that lessons from simple idealized cases of disagreement shed light on complex cases of disagreement. In this chapter I analyze some of these simple cases in order to demonstrate that while they do lend support for conciliationism, the lessons do not necessarily carry over to more complex cases of disagreement. This is important because cases of disagreement between inquirers are better understood as complex, not simple.
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