Advertisement

New (and Old) Atheism(s) Reconsidered

  • Íñigo Ongay de FelipeEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter provides a deconstruction of the ontological position of atheism about God’s inexistence. The author first offers an analytical consideration of the multiplicity of meanings that the negative term “atheism” can be accorded depending on the particular interpretation of the concept of God we may consider. The chapter argues that such diversity notwithstanding, two major versions of atheism can be distinguished: one that proceeds to deny God’s existence (existential atheism) and another that negates the very conceptual consistence of the idea of God (essential atheism). Finally, the point is made that the view of God as an infinite and necessary being is most compellingly denied by the essential version than by its existential counterpart.

References

  1. Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer. 2010. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. Frankfurt am Mein: S. Fischer Verlage.Google Scholar
  2. Bueno, Gustavo. 1986. El animal divino. Ensayo de una filosofía materialista de la religión. Oviedo: Pentalfa.Google Scholar
  3. ———. 2007. La fe del ateo. Madrid: Temas de Hoy.Google Scholar
  4. Carnap, Rudolf. 1931. Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache. Erkenntnis 2 (1): 219–241.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Dawkins, Richard. 2003. A Devil’s Chaplain. Reflections on Hope, Lies, Science and Love. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.Google Scholar
  6. ———. 2006. The God Delusion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.Google Scholar
  7. Dennett, Daniel C. 2006. Breaking the Spell. Religion As a Natural Phenomenon. London: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
  8. Flew, Anthony. 1968. Theology and Falsification. In Reason and Responsibility: Readings on Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, ed. Joel Feinberg, 48–49. Belmont: CA. Dickenson Publishing Co.Google Scholar
  9. Hanson, Norwood R. 1971. The Agnostic’s Dilema. In What I Do not Believe and Other Essays, 303–308. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Leibniz, Gottfried. 1981. Monadologia. Pentalfa: Oviedo.Google Scholar
  11. Malcom, Norman. 1960. Anselm’s Ontological Arguments. The Philosophical Review 69: 41–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Ongay de Felipe, Íñigo. 2014. El uso del argumento ontológico en la filosofía de Duns Scoto, Gottfried Leibniz y Gustavo Bueno. Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 21: 153–161.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Pérez Jara, Javier. 2005. Materia y racionalidad: sobre la inexistencia de la idea de Dios. El Basilisco 35: 27–64.Google Scholar
  14. Platinga, Alvin. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Russell, Bertrand. 2009. What Is an Agnostic? In The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 557–565. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  16. ———. 1952. Is There a God? In The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 11, 547–548. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  17. Voltaire. 1901. A Philosophical Dictionary. The Works of Voltaire. A Contemporary Version. Vol VII, Part I. New York: E.R Dumont.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University DeustoBilbaoSpain
  2. 2.Fundación Gustavo BuenoOviedoSpain

Personalised recommendations