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Counterfactual Thinking in Cooperation Dynamics

  • Luís Moniz PereiraEmail author
  • Francisco C. Santos
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 49)

Abstract

Counterfactual Thinking is a human cognitive ability studied in a wide variety of domains. It captures the process of reasoning about a past event that did not occur, namely what would have happened had this event occurred, or, otherwise, to reason about an event that did occur but what would ensue had it not. Given the wide cognitive empowerment of counterfactual reasoning in the human individual, the question arises of how the presence of individuals with this capability may improve cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. Here we propose a mathematical model, grounded on Evolutionary Game Theory, to examine the population dynamics emerging from the interplay between counterfactual thinking and social learning (i.e., individuals that learn from the actions and success of others) whenever the individuals in the population face a collective dilemma. Our results suggest that counterfactual reasoning fosters coordination in collective action problems occurring in large populations, and has a limited impact on cooperation dilemmas in which coordination is not required. Moreover, we show that a small prevalence of individuals resorting to counterfactual thinking is enough to nudge an entire population towards highly cooperative standards.

Keywords

Counterfactuals Cooperation Evolutionary Game Theory 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to The Anh Han and Tom Lenaerts for comments. We are also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their improvement recommendations This work was supported by FCT-Portugal/MEC, grants NOVA-LINCS UID/CEC/04516/2013, INESC-ID UID/CEC/50021/2013, PTDC/EEI-SII/5081/2014, and PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.NOVA-LINCS and Faculdade de Ciências e TecnologiaUniversidade Nova de LisboaLisbonPortugal
  2. 2.INESC-ID and Instituto Superior TécnicoUniversidade de LisboaLisbonPortugal
  3. 3.ATP-GroupPorto SalvoPortugal

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