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Default Soundness in the Old Approach: An Epistemic Analysis of Default Reasoning

  • David GaytánEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 49)

Abstract

By means of an epistemological analysis of the internal components of default reasoning, and revisiting Geffner’s proposal about causal asymmetries, it is given in this paper an answer to the problem of soundness in default reasoning. The kernel of that answer is an intentionalist view of certain kind of connections inside the internal structure of a default rule. This intentionalist view consists partially in assuming certain strong relationships between the prerequisite, the justifications and the conclusion in a default. Another ingredient of this perspective is the distinction between the context-dependence of a relationship and that of its relatas. It is offered a formal representation of the internal structure of default reasoning. Then it is built an intuitive characterization of the notion of default logical consequence. This notion is similar to the traditional notion in the sense that it attends to the challenge of clarifying the inferential mechanism of a schema, even when in the present paper the proposal differs from the traditional one.

Keywords

Default consequence Default soundness Causal asymmetries 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research was benefited from the PAPIIT-UNAM project “Non Classical Logics and Argumentation in Science”, IN401619; as well as from the discussions carried out in the Special Interest Group in Non-Monotonicity, SIGNO-MON, UNAM; and in the group of Formal Epistemology and Non Classical Logics of the Research Program in Science and Philosophy, PRINCIPHIA, UACM.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Autonomous University of Mexico City, National Autonomous University of MexicoMexico CityMexico

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