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One-Time Programs Made Practical

  • Lianying ZhaoEmail author
  • Joseph I. Choi
  • Didem Demirag
  • Kevin R. B. Butler
  • Mohammad Mannan
  • Erman Ayday
  • Jeremy Clark
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11598)

Abstract

A one-time program (OTP) works as follows: Alice provides Bob with the implementation of some function. Bob can have the function evaluated exclusively on a single input of his choosing. Once executed, the program will fail to evaluate on any other input. State-of-the-art one-time programs have remained theoretical, requiring custom hardware that is cost-ineffective/unavailable, or confined to ad-hoc/unrealistic assumptions. To bridge this gap, we explore how the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) of modern CPUs can realize the OTP functionality. Specifically, we build two flavours of such a system: in the first, the TEE directly enforces the one-timeness of the program; in the second, the program is represented with a garbled circuit and the TEE ensures Bob’s input can only be wired into the circuit once, equivalent to a smaller cryptographic primitive called one-time memory. These have different performance profiles: the first is best when Alice’s input is small and Bob’s is large, and the second for the converse.

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lianying Zhao
    • 1
    Email author
  • Joseph I. Choi
    • 2
  • Didem Demirag
    • 3
  • Kevin R. B. Butler
    • 2
  • Mohammad Mannan
    • 3
  • Erman Ayday
    • 4
  • Jeremy Clark
    • 3
  1. 1.University of TorontoTorontoCanada
  2. 2.University of FloridaGainesvilleUSA
  3. 3.Concordia UniversityMontrealCanada
  4. 4.Case Western Reserve UniversityClevelandUSA

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