Chameleon Hash Time-Lock Contract for Privacy Preserving Payment Channel Networks

  • Bin Yu
  • Shabnam Kasra KermanshahiEmail author
  • Amin Sakzad
  • Surya Nepal
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11821)


Payment channel networks (PCNs) have been proposed to address the low transaction throughput of the permissionless blockchain protocols. Though the PCNs allow users to have the unlimited number of transactions in the channel without interacting with blockchain, it leaks the entire payment paths to the public. To address the payment path leakage issue, we propose a Chameleon-hash based payment protocol, called Chameleon Hash Time-Lock Contract (CHTLC). Using Chameleon-hash function in a multi-layer fashion guarantees that no user can recover the payment path if at least one intermediate payment node is honest. For the same payment path, compared with Multi-hop Hash Time-Lock Contract (MHTLC) protocol of Malavolta et al. [1], CHTLC is 5 times faster in the payment data initialisation, and the communication bandwidth is reduced significantly from 17, 000 KB to just 7.7 KB.


Blockchain Payment channel networks Payment privacy 


  1. 1.
    Malavolta, G., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Kate, A., Maffei, M., Ravi, S.: Concurrency and privacy with payment-channel networks. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 455–471. ACM (2017)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Nakamoto, S., et al.: Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system (2008)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Wood, G., et al.: Ethereum: a secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger. Ethereum Proj. Yellow Pap. 151, 1–32 (2014)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bitcoin transaction throughput. Accessed on 14 Feb
  5. 5.
    Bitcoin lightning network. Accessed on 14 Feb 2018
  6. 6.
    Ghosh, A., Mahdian, M., Reeves, D.M., Pennock, D.M., Fugger, R.: Mechanism design on trust networks. In: Deng, X., Graham, F.C. (eds.) WINE 2007. LNCS, vol. 4858, pp. 257–268. Springer, Heidelberg (2007). Scholar
  7. 7.
    Stellar protocol. Accessed on 14 Feb 2018
  8. 8.
    Ripple network. Accessed on 14 Feb 2018
  9. 9.
    Fugger, R.: Money as IOUs in social trust networks & a proposal for a decentralized currency network protocol. Hypertext document, vol. 106 (2004).
  10. 10.
    Viswanath, B., Mondal, M., Gummadi, K.P., Mislove, A., Post, A.: Canal: scaling social network-based sybil tolerance schemes. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM European Conference on Computer Systems, pp. 309–322. ACM (2012)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Miller, A., Bentov, I., Kumaresan, R., McCorry, P.: Sprites: payment channels that go faster than lightning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.05812 (2017)
  12. 12.
    Malavolta, G., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Kate, A., Maffei, M.: SilentWhispers: enforcing security and privacy in credit networks. In: 24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS (2017)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Moreno-Sanchez, P., Kate, A., Maffei, M., Pecina, K.: Privacy preserving payments in credit networks. In: Network and Distributed Security Symposium (2015)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Heilman, E., Alshenibr, L., Baldimtsi, F., Scafuro, A., Goldberg, S.: TumbleBit: an untrusted bitcoin-compatible anonymous payment hub. In: Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (2017)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Decker, C., Wattenhofer, R.: A fast and scalable payment network with bitcoin duplex micropayment channels. In: Pelc, A., Schwarzmann, A.A. (eds.) SSS 2015. LNCS, vol. 9212, pp. 3–18. Springer, Cham (2015). Scholar
  16. 16.
    Poon, J., Dryja, T.: The bitcoin lightning network: scalable off-chain instant payments (2016)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    McCorry, P., Möser, M., Shahandasti, S.F., Hao, F.: Towards bitcoin payment networks. In: Liu, J.K.K., Steinfeld, R. (eds.) ACISP 2016. LNCS, vol. 9722, pp. 57–76. Springer, Cham (2016). Scholar
  18. 18.
    Gudgeon, L., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Roos, S., McCorry, P., Gervais, A.: SoK: off the chain transactions. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/360 (2019).
  19. 19.
    Antonopoulos, A.M.: Mastering Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital Cryptocurrencies. O’Reilly Media Inc., Sebastopol (2014)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Hashed timelock contracts. Accessed 14 Feb 2018
  21. 21.
    Tsuchiya, P.F.: The landmark hierarchy: a new hierarchy for routing in very large networks. In: ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 35–42. ACM (1988)Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Prihodko, P., Zhigulin, S., Sahno, M., Ostrovskiy, A., Osuntokun, O.: Flare: an approach to routing in lightning network. White Paper (2016)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Roos, S., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Kate, A., Goldberg, I.: Settling payments fast and private: efficient decentralized routing for path-based transactions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.05748 (2017)
  24. 24.
    Krawczyk, H., Rabin, T.: Chameleon hashing and signatures. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 1998, 10 (1998)Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Attiya, H., Welch, J.: Distributed Computing: Fundamentals, Simulations, and Advanced Topics, vol. 19. Wiley, Hoboken (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Cristian, F., Aghili, H., Strong, R.: Approximate clock synchronization despite omission and performance failures and processor joins. In: Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, pp. 218–223 (1986)Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In: Proceedings 2001 IEEE International Conference on Cluster Computing, pp. 136–145. IEEE (2001)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bin Yu
    • 1
    • 2
  • Shabnam Kasra Kermanshahi
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Amin Sakzad
    • 1
  • Surya Nepal
    • 2
  1. 1.Monash UniversityMelbourneAustralia
  2. 2.CSIRO Data 61MelbourneAustralia

Personalised recommendations