Epilogue: What Have We Learned?

  • Thomas J. MiceliEmail author


This chapter summarizes the conclusions from the prior chapters and weaves them into a coherent economic perspective on the goals and effects of criminal punishment. The discussion not only emphasizes the ability of economic theory to describe the structure and function of legal institutions as well as the decisions of rational offenders, but also cautions that an economic approach to criminal justice is dependent on the values that a given society seeks to pursue, which is ultimately a question of philosophy and politics.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ConnecticutStorrs MansfieldUSA

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