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The Market: Evolutionary Limits and Possibilities

  • Filipe Nobre Faria
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism book series (PASTCL)

Abstract

This chapter assesses if the free market is a suitable alternative to the shortcomings of liberal democracy from an evolutionary perspective, namely from the perspective of multilevel selection. This section scrutinises the hypothetical superiority of free markets over liberal democracies regarding preference satisfaction. The chapter focuses on the impact that free markets and their adjacent liberal satisfaction of preferences have on the evolutionary fitness of groups. To analyse such an impact, this chapter appraises the most relevant evolutionary defence of the institutional superiority of the market order: F. A. Hayek’s model of cultural group selection. Overall, chapter six answers to another central question of the book: what is the desirability of the liberal satisfaction of preferences concerning institutional sustainability?

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Filipe Nobre Faria
    • 1
  1. 1.Nova University of LisbonLisbonPortugal

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