Reassessing Liberal Democracy’s Shortcomings and Their Institutional Market-Enhancing Solutions

  • Filipe Nobre Faria
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism book series (PASTCL)


Through the evolutionary multilevel selection framework, this chapter reanalyses the shortcomings of liberal democracy and their institutional market-enhancing solutions contained within public choice literature. Hence, this chapter analyses the main insights of rational/public choice theory that previous chapters explored, like the shortcomings of liberal democracy (e.g. rent-seeking, the principal–agent problem) and the potential market-enhancing solutions (e.g. market autocracy and market-liberal contractarianism). It analyses if markets truly have a higher capacity to satisfy preferences and if liberal democracy is as problematic at satisfying individual preferences as classic public choice theorists claim. Overall, this chapter answers to a central question of the book: what is the capacity of both liberal democracy and market liberalism to maximise preference satisfaction?


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Filipe Nobre Faria
    • 1
  1. 1.Nova University of LisbonLisbonPortugal

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