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Introduction

  • Filipe Nobre Faria
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism book series (PASTCL)

Abstract

The central goal of this work is to assess the evolutionary sustainability of liberalism. Based on the model of multilevel selection, the book appraises the capacity of liberal democracy and free markets to satisfy preferences and analyses the evolutionary impact of the liberal satisfaction of preferences on social groups. The book develops an evolutionary political theory of preference satisfaction that operates in the tradition of scientific realism and that constitutes a more accurate explanation of public choice.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Filipe Nobre Faria
    • 1
  1. 1.Nova University of LisbonLisbonPortugal

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