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The Timeless Solution

  • Ciro De FlorioEmail author
  • Aldo Frigerio
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)

Abstract

In this last chapter, we consider the timeless solutions to the dilemma of foreknowledge. In particular, in the first part, we present the Timeless Eternalist view, in which a timeless God eternally sees a world as it is described by a B-theory of time. In the second part, we develop an original account, which we call Perspectival Fragmentalism: this view adopts a particular perspectival framework for the interpretation of the propositions, and it assumes a robust, dynamic, conception of time. The background metaphysics is inspired by Kit Fine’s Fragmentalism.

Keywords

Timeless solutions Perspectival semantics Dynamic conception of time Fragmentalism 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversità Cattolica del Sacro CuoreMilanItaly

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