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Extreme Measures

  • Ciro De FlorioEmail author
  • Aldo Frigerio
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)

Abstract

In this chapter, we consider two families of solutions to the dilemma of foreknowledge: the Open Theism and the Theological Determinism. They can be seen as extreme solutions since they radically reinterpret the notions occurring in the problem. Specifically, open theists redefine the concept of omniscience, while the theological determinists redefine the concept of free will. We advance some criticisms to these views.

Keywords

Libertarian conception of free will Compatibilism Open theism Determinism 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversità Cattolica del Sacro CuoreMilanItaly

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