A Vaccination Game for Mitigation Active Worms Propagation in P2P Networks

  • Mohamed Amine RguibiEmail author
  • Najem MoussaEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11704)


The spread of computer active worms is usually modeled by epidemic diffusion processes and widely applied to peer-to-peer computing and social networks. Many protective interventions are recommended to restrain the electronic epidemic, such as immunization strategies or the installation of anti-virus software. In real-world networks, a natural framework for game theory is created where each player (internet user) decides on his own strategy: to secure his host by paying the cost of antivirus software or to remain unsecured, and then takes the risk of being infected later. We introduce this issue by presenting an agent-based model for simulating a vaccination game. In this work, we study the neighbor’s impact including the imitation behavior effects on vaccination behavior, which may help to relieve the severity of active worms in peer to peer networks. The simulation results show that imitation behavior works well only when the network initially have more than 20% of vaccinated peers. Moreover, the higher the cost of vaccination, the more players tend to imitate the strategy of neighbors.


Epidemic Game theory Peer-to-peer 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LAROSERI, Department of Computer Science, Faculty of SciencesUniversity of Chouaib DoukkaliEl JadidaMorocco

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