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Impure Public Goods and the Aggregative Game Approach

  • Anja BrummeEmail author
  • Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Dirk Rübbelke
Chapter
Part of the Springer Climate book series (SPCL)

Abstract

Drawing on the example of Cobb–Douglas preferences, we show how the impure public good model can be traced back to the conventional pure public good model. On the one hand, this approach allows applying the aggregative game approach for establishing existence and uniqueness of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium in the voluntary contribution game. On the other hand, differences between the impure and the pure public good model become evident, for instance, the emergence of noncontributors in the Cournot–Nash equilibrium is less likely in the impure public good model. Furthermore, Warr neutrality, i.e., invariance of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium when income is redistributed between contributors, cannot be expected a priori in this model.

Keywords

Impure public goods Private co-benefits Voluntary provision Aggregative game approach 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anja Brumme
    • 1
    Email author
  • Wolfgang Buchholz
    • 2
  • Dirk Rübbelke
    • 1
  1. 1.Technische Universität Bergakademie FreibergFreibergGermany
  2. 2.University of RegensburgRegensburgGermany

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