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Qualified Majorities and Expert Choice

  • Adiel Teixeira de AlmeidaEmail author
  • Danielle Costa Morais
  • Hannu Nurmi
Chapter
Part of the Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation book series (AGDN, volume 9)

Abstract

What if the decision makers have different degrees of expertise and the aim is to maximize the probability of a correct decision? (The first three sub-sections are largely based on Nurmi, Voting procedures under uncertainty. Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg, pp 49–59, 2002) This possibility has been considered for a long time. We shall describe the main results in this field of inquiry where the degrees of competence play a crucial role. We begin with a classic result that is based on the assumption that the individual decision competences are equal and representable by the probability that the decision made by the individual is correct. The issue of where the competence probability comes from is left open. We also discuss epistemic paradoxes, i.e. peculiarities encountered when aggregating premises of an argument separately from the conclusions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE)RecifeBrazil
  2. 2.University of TurkuTurkuFinland

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