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Two Procedures Based on Ratings

  • Adiel Teixeira de AlmeidaEmail author
  • Danielle Costa Morais
  • Hannu Nurmi
Chapter
Part of the Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation book series (AGDN, volume 9)

Abstract

While most social choice results pertain to ranking environments where the individuals submit their preference relations (and these only) to the balloting procedure, there are procedures that require a slightly different kind of input from the voters. We discuss two such systems: the majority judgment and the range voting. These are relatively recent entrants in the social choice field. As all procedures they have their advantages and disadvantages, but deserve attention is some decision situations.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE)RecifeBrazil
  2. 2.University of TurkuTurkuFinland

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