More Than Two Alternatives
We introduce and discuss the most common voting procedures. Our starting point is the observation that voting rules can make a significant difference in the voting outcomes. First we deal with the ambiguity of the notion of majority outcome in cases involving more than two alternatives or candidates. The concepts of Condorcet winner and core are introduced. We then define the voting procedures and present some descriptive devices for the analysis of voting situations.
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